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COMMENTS
TORTS-RECOVERY FOR PRENATAL INJURIES AND DEATHS
The purpose of this article is to show the advancements which have been made
by some courts in destroying their archaic ideas of not allowing recovery for in-
juries and deaths to the child while still en ventre sa mere.' The article is divided
into two parts. Part I is a discussion of recovery for injuries to the fetus. And
Part II concerns injuries to the fetus which cause death prior to, or shortly after,
birth.
I. CAUsE OF ACTIoN As A RESULT OF PRENATAL INJURIES
Prior to 1946 most jurisdictions denied recovery for injuries received by a
viable infant while en ventre sa mere, even though the infant was born alive.
The courts based their decisions on the following: (1) the defendant could owe no
duty of conduct to a person who was not in existence at the time of his act, (2)
the difficulty of proving a causal connection between negligence and damage was
too great, (3) too much danger of fictitious claims, and (4) a lack of precedent
on the matter.2
The first reported case to break away from the now obsolescent view denying
recovery was Bonbrest v. Kotz,3 decided in the District of Columbia. The court
held that a viable infant born alive may maintain an action for the prenatal injuries
suffered. Since the Bonbrest decision, there has been a series of cases which have
followed its holding.4
The Missouri Supreme Court, en banc, in 1953 followed this well-defined trend
in Steggall v. Morris,5 overruling a prior decision denying liability.6 Observing that
a court should not "refuse to entertain suits for the reason that to afford a remedy
may at times give rise to fraudulent claims," the court held that:
1. "In its mother's womb. A term descriptive of an unborn child." BLAcK,
LAw DIcTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
2. Buel v. United Railways Co., 248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913); Allaire v.
St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900); Dietrich v. Inhabitants of
Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884); Newman v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich. 60,
274 N.W. 710 (1937); Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921);
Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 Atl. 704 (1901); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling
Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935); Lipps v. Milwaukee Electric
Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916). For general discussion of the
above cases and others of similar holding, see Annotations 97 A.L.R. 1524 (1935);
10 A.L.R.2d 1059 (1950). See also Cason, The Case for the Right of Action, 15 Mo.
L. REv. 211 (1950).
3. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
4. Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons, Inc., 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d
909 (1951); Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953); Damasiewicz v.
Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365,
38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Rainey v. Horn, 72 So.2d 434 (Miss. 1954); Woods v.
Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1952); Jasinsky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St.
529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950). For further discussion of these holdings see Annotation
27 A.L.R.2d 1256 (1953).
5. 258 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. En Banc 1953).
6. Buel v. United Rys., 248 Mo. 126, 154 S.W. 71 (1913). See also Comment,
19 Mo. L. REv. 81 (1953).
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.. a viable child, injured while en ventre sa mere, born alive, may after
its birth maintain a tort action against the tort-feasor for the injury in-
flicted.7
The court also stated:
Certainly, courts are not going to refuse to entertain suits for the redress
of wrongs because a plaintiff would have difficulty in proving his case. Nor
should a court refuse to entertain such suits for the reason that to afford
a remedy at times give rise to fraudulent claims. Neither one is a sufficient
reason for denying a cause of action.8
The language found in the Steggall case is representative of that found in
most cases on this subject. Most courts, however, carefully limit their decisions to
recovery for the infant who was viable at the time of the injury.9
The requirement that the injured infant be viable at the time of the injury
appears to be predicated upon a questionable basis. Viable is defined as:
Capable of living, especially capable of living outside the uterus; said of a
fetus that has reached such a stage of development that it can live out-
side of the uterus.10
This definition does not greatly assist in the necessary determination of when
a fetus becomes viable. Viability does not occur at the same definite time for all
infants and, at best, can only be determined within a close approximation. Actual
determination of viability is a relative matter, depending upon many factors other
than the age of the fetus.11 In view of this, it is obvious that the only method
available for proof of viability is the opinion of an expert medical witness. The
reluctance of the courts to allow recovery for injury to the nonviable fetus is mainly
based upon the reasoning that there can be no injury to someone who is not yet
recognized as a living being.
It is somewhat surprising that courts would make this distinction between
viability and nonviability, for in the other fields of law it has long been recognized
that "existence" of the fetus begins at the moment of conception.12 If the infant
is in "existence" at the time of the injury there should be a right to recover for
any injuries suffered as a result of the negligent act. In response to this idea,
courts in a few jurisdictions have expressly abandoned the viability rule in favor
of a biological approach which emphasizes the separate nature of the child from
the moment of conception. 2 In the Bonbrest case,14 the court quoted a Canadian
decision:
7. Supra note 5, at 581.
8. Id., at 580.
9. Cases cited note 4 supra.
10. DORLAND, AMERICAN ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (21st ed. 1948).
11. GREENHILL, PRINCIPLES & PRACTICES OF OBSTETRICS (10th ed. 1951).
12. The criminal law regards it as a separate entity and the law of property
considers it in being for all purposes which are to its benefit. For discussion and
cases of these fields of law, see 15 Mo. L. REv. 211 (1950), supra note 2.
13. Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727, 728
.(1956) (The fetus was injured in the sixth week of pregnancy and the court, allow-
ing recovery, stated: "Where a child is born after a tortious injury sustained at
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The wrongful act which constitutes the crime may constitute also a tort,
and if the law recognizes the separate existence of the unborn child suffi-
ciently to punish the crime, it is difficult to see why it should not also
recognize its separate existence for the purpose of redressing the tort. 5
This statement was not necessary for the decision in Bonbrest, so it would
have to be considered dictum. However, if the situation should arise, it would
seem this court would not require viability as a prerequisite to recovery.
The entire problem in allowing recovery for injury to a nonviable infant is the
difficulty of proving causation. However, the proof may be handled in the same
manner as for viability-through the use of an expert medical witness. If the
causal connection cannot be proved, there will be no recovery. But if causation can
any period after conception, he has a cause of action."); Daley v. Meier, 178
N.E.2d 691, 694 (Ill. App. Ct. 1961) (Where the mother was one month pregnant
when the fetus was injured, the court said, "Therefore, it is our conclusion that
an infant, who was born alive and survives, can maintain an action to recover for
prenatal injuries, medically provable as resulting from the negligence of another,
even if it had not reached the state of a viable fetus at the time of the injury.");
Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 485, 147 A.2d 108, 110 (1958) ("We adopt the
opinion that the fetus from the time of conception becomes a separate organism
and remains so throughout its life. Also that the mother's biological contribution
from conception on is to furnish nourishment and protection for it. And the fact
that [the fetus] may not live if its protection and nourishment are cut off earlier
than the viable state of its development is not to destroy its separability; it is
rather to describe conditions under which life will not continue."); Smith v. Bren-
nan, 31 N.J. 353, 363, 157 A.2d 497, 502 (1960), quoting with approval Stemmer
v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 466, 26 A.2d 684, 687 (1942) ("WThile it is a fact that
there is close dependence by the unborn child on the organism of the mother, it
is not disputed today that the mother and the child are two separate and distinct
entities; that the unborn child has its own system of circulation of the blood
separate and apart from the mother; that there is no communication between the
two circulation systems; that the heart beat of the child is not in time with that
of the mother but is more rapid; that here is no dependence by the child on the
mother except for sustenance. It might be remarked here that even after birth the
child depends for sustenance upon the mother or upon a third party. It is not the
fact that an unborn child is a part of the mother, but that rather in the unborn
state it lived with the mother, we might say, and from conception on developed
its own distinct, spearate personality."); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 543,
545, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696, 697, 698 (1953) (An action by an infant whose mother was
struck by an automobile during her third month of pregnancy. "We ought to be
safe in this respect in saying that legal separability should begin where there is
biological separability. We know something more of the actual process of concep-
tion and foetal development now than when some of the common law cases were
decided; and what we know makes it possible to demonstrate clearly that separa-
bility begins at conception." And further, "If a child born after an injury sus-
tained at any period of his prenatal life can prove the effect on him of the tort,
he makes out a right to recover."). Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 273, 164 A.2d
93, 96 (1960) ("As for the notion that the child must have been viable when the
injuries were received, which has claimed the attention of several states, we regard
it as having little to do with the basic right to recover, when the foetus is regarded
as having existence as a separate creature from the moment of conception. . ..
The question is primarily one of causation, and since medical proof of that is
necessary, we now remove the bars from it in lmine.").
14. Bonbrest v. Kotz, supra note 3.
15. Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, 4 D.L.R. 337 (1933).
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be established, there is no logical reason to deny recovery even if the fetus was
not viable.
The viability versus nonviability problem was encountered by the New York
courts in Kelly v. Gregory8 where an unborn child was injured when its mother,
in her third month of pregnancy, was struck by an automobile. The court took
the advanced position, and in allowing recovery stated:
We ought to be safe in this respect in saying that legal separability should
begin where there is biological separability. We know something more of
the actual process of conception and foetal development now than when
some of the common law cases were decided; and what we know makes
it possible to demonstrate clearly that separability begins at conception.
The court concluded:
If a child born after an injury sustained at any period of his prenatal life
can prove the effect on him of the tort, . . . he makes out a right to re-
cover. (Emphasis added).
This decision does not seem offensive to a good sense of justice. Here, there has
been an injury caused by a negligent defendant and, as in the usual custom where
any wrong is done, the injured is allowed to recover. When it is realized that the
results of the negligent actor's conduct are exactly the same whether the fetus was
viable or not, the denial of recovery merely because of nonviability works a great
injustice. This consideration alone should provide the courts with sufficient reason
to discard the viability requirement.
In the Montreal Tramways case,1 7 the court very ably stated the unjust re-
sults of holding to the viability requirement:
If a right of action be denied to the child it will be compelled, without any
fault on its part, to go through life carrying the seal of another's fault and
bearing a very heavy burden of infirmity and inconvenience without any
compensation therefor.
With expanded medical knowledge and improved scientific techniques making
proof easier and more accurate, coupled with the trend in a few cases discarding
the viability requirement and allowing recovery, the courts should reconsider this
question and base their decisions (as they would in other negligence cases) on the
causal connection between the act and the injury.
There is little doubt that the judicial system is qualified to weigh the factors
involved and to reach a just decision based upon the proof offered. It is the
writer's opinion that the trend to allow recovery for injury to the nonviable fetus
will continue, and in the future the courts will make no distinction between in-
juries sustained in the previable stage and injuries caused in the viable stage.
II. CAUSE OF AcroN FOR DEATH OF AN UNBORN CHILD
In the event that the fetus is killed by a negligent act, a cause of action for
wrongful death arises in favor of the parent or the infant's legal representative.
16. Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 543, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696, 697 (1953).
17. Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, sitpra note 15.
[Vol. 29
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This cause of action did not exist at common law but is purely a creature of
statute.'5 With the advent of modem statutes creating such a cause of action,
courts were confronted with the task of statutory interpretation. The Missouri
statute allows a cause of action whenever the death of a "person" is caused by a
negligent act. In SteggalU v. Morris'9 the court interpreted the word "person," as
used in the statute, to include a viable unborn child who was allegedly injured on
May 2, 1952, born May 5, 1952, and, as a result of such injuries, died on May 23,
1952. It should be observed that the court required the child to be born alive.20
The length. of time that the child lives after birth should not be important. It
should be important only that the child did live for some instant of time.21
A. Miscarriage
It has long been established that pregnant women may recover for their
injuries which result from a miscarriage caused by a defendant's negligence.22 But
with the advent of a cause of action for prenatal injuries, an action may also be
brought for the death of the child who was viable when the accident occurred.
It would seem that if the death of the fetus is directly related to the miscarriage,
the proof necessary to establish the mother's cause of action would be basically
the same as that needed to establish the cause of action for the death of the fetus.
It is possible that there would be an act so violent that the causal connection
would be so apparent that medical testimony would not be necessary,23 but, even
here, the more convincing decision should be based upon expert testimony.
18. § 537.080, RSMo 1959 ("Whenever the death of a person shall be caused
by a wrongful act, . . ."); Donelson's Estate v. Gorman, 192 S.W.2d 29 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1946).
19. Steggall v. Morris, supra note 5.
20. Drabels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951); But
Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959), held over a vigorous
dissent that survival is not necessary. Accord, Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368
P.2d 1 (1962); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
21. In regard to property law, Sanford v. Getman, 124 Misc. 80, 206 N.Y.S.
865 (1924), held that a child which never cried, but breathed, and whose heart
beat for some moments, was "born alive" and capable of inheriting; In re Union
Trust Co., 89 Misc. 69, 151 N.Y.S. 246 (1915), where the court held a child never
heard to cry and who did not live, but where heart beats were perceptible and
could be heard, though no respiration could be induced, was "born alive" and was
"issue" within the meaning of the will. But see Goff v. Anderson, 91 Ky. 303, 15
S.W. 866 (1891), where the court held that "born" as ordinarily understood and
in fact, means "brought forth," and a child is completely born when delivered or
expelled from and becomes external of the mother, whether the placenta has been
separated or the cord cut. It may be contended that there should be no distinction
in the different fields of law as to when a child is born. Logically, if there is any
sign of life, however slight, at the time of delivery, the child should be considered
as being born alive. It is just as illogical to permit recovery for the estate of a viable
fetus and to deny it to the case of a nonviable fetus as it is to allow the injured
viable fetus to recover damages and deny recovery to the nonviable fetus.
22. Finer v. Nichols, 158 Mo. App. 539, 138 S.W. 889 (St. L. Ct. App. 1911).
For a general discussion of this and other cases see Annotation 10 A.L.R.2d 639
(1950).
23. Mentioned in Superior Transfer Co. v. Halstead, 189 Md. 536, 56 A.2d
706 (1948), although not so decided. It would seem if such proof could be estab-
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Since the same act that causes injury to the mother through the miscarriage
causes death to the fetus, there is no convincing reason for limiting recovery for
death of the infant to those cases where the fetus was viable. If proof is adequate
the courts should not limit this action to the mother only and, thereby, allow the
tort-feasor to escape from liability for causing the death of the fetus.
B. Abortion
The civil cause of action for an unlawful abortion is usually against the doctor
who has either negligently or intentionally caused the abortion. In the event the
abortion was caused negligently rather than intentionally, the action will be one
for malpractice. In the negligence action for prenatal injuries the physician is held
to a standard of performance similar to standards required in other malpractice
actions; that is, of employing the skill and knowledge commonly possessed by
members of the medical profession in good standing under similar circumstances.
2 4
There have been instances reported where malpractice actions have been brought
for the negligent administration of irradiation treatment to the mother that
affected the child,25 and causes of action have been allowed for negligent delivery.26
With increased medical knowledge of the causes of prenatal defects, the physician
is duty bound to keep abreast of the recent medical advances in this area.
The courts have rarely been faced with the situation where the abortion was
intentional and a parent sues for money damages. The most striking case in this
area was that of Touriel v. Benveniste.27 Here the wife's consent did not bar the
husband's recovery from the abortionist. The recovery was for the invasion of his
personal rights in the matrimonial status. The abortionist contended that the
husband's cause of action, if any, was limited to one for the wrongful death of the
unborn child, and that this was not actionable. The court, in rejecting this con-
tention, stressed that the act of abortion has, in addition to the defendant's con-
tention, a dual aspect in that it is not only a battery directed against the person
of the wife, to which she could consent, but that it is as well an invasion of the
rights of each of the parties to the matrimonial status. The court further stated:
lished by testimony of a layman it should be sufficient. The more obvious case
would be where the mother is killed and the child dies in the uterus.
24. PROSSER, TORTS § 31 (2d ed. 1955).
25. See Smith v. Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N.E.2d 446 (1939); Stem-
mer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (1942). Both cases denied recovery and
both have been overruled by Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953),
and Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960). In the overruling cases
the physician negligently misdiagnosed the mother's condition as a tumor and
administered irradiation treatments which harmed the child; in Smith/, the infant
died after birth; in Stemmer, the child was born a microcephalic. These treatments
involved therapeutic doses, which were much stronger than the amounts used for
diagnosis.
26. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946); Scott v. McPheeters,
33 Cal. App.2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1938); Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38
N.W.2d 838 (1949); Rainey v. Horn, 72 So. 2d 434 (Miss. 1954).
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Abortion is an act directed against the fruits of the matrimonial
union. In the fruits of this union the husband as well as the wife has a
legally protectable interest.
A wife's control over the destinies and fortunes of the unborn child
is not absolute, but is limited by and subject to the rights of others. Her
own rights she may forfeit. But she cannot waive or give up or lose rights
which are not hers to assert.
We conclude that the husband has a legally protectable interest in
his unborn child; that the wife cannot circumvent that interest by con-
sent to an illegal abortion; that the destruction of the unborn child with-
out the consent of the husband is legally ineffectual. In short, the hus-
band's consent is necessary to the performance of an illegal abortion. Ab-
sent his consent he is entitled to bring a suit for invasion of his personal
rights in the matrimonial status. The performance of an illegal abortion
on the person of his wife is as much actionable as an invasion of his privacy
or the publication of defamatory matter affecting his reputation.
Since the husband's cause of action is not for wrongful death of the
child but for a direct invasion of the husband's personal interest in the
matrimonial status, the requirement that a live birth precede a cause of
action for wrongful death is irrelevant.
This holding raises two questions: (1) What persons have a legally recognized
interest in an unborn child, and (2) What is the nature and extent of this interest?
At common law the parent had an interest in the minor child in the form of a
property right. This interest was usually for "loss of services"; 28 that is, the
partial or complete loss of the child's services, due to destruction of his physical
or mental ability, during a part or all of the period of his minority. The parent suf-
fered further loss in the impaired capacity of the child to earn and render wages
to him. It cannot be denied that the amount of money damages to be awarded
in an action for loss of services of a child is subject to conjecture and it is
entirely possible that the cost of rearing the child would exceed any conceivable
benefit to be expected by the parent. 29 At common law, if the injury caused the
death of the child, the parents had no right to recover, except for loss of services
between the time of the injury and that of death. Therefore, any cause of action
for injuries to a child too young to render services, or which resulted in immediate
death of the child, must necessarily have a statutory basis. Under the Missouri
Statute,30 if a factual situation similar to Touriel, were presented, it would possibly
be decided favorably to the husband; but the cause of action would probably be
based upon wrongful death rather than upon an injury to the "personal rights in
the matrimonial status." However, the statute creates a cause of action for wrong-
ful death. If the court would find itself bound by the viable doctrine, as set forth
in Steggall v. Morris,31 no recovery would be allowed because an abortion is usually
induced at an early stage of pregnancy, before the fetus is capable of separate life;
28. Beebe v. Kansas City, 223 Mo. App. 642, 17 S.W.2d 608 (K.C. Ct. App.
1929).
29. PROSSER, TORTS § 105 (2d ed. 1955).
30. § 537.080, RSMo 1959.
31. Steggall v. Morris, supra note 5.
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and if there is no life which the law recognizes there can be no wrongful death.
But if the court would discard the viability requirement the same result as the
Touriel case could be reached in an action for wrongful death.
It is the writer's opinion that the Touriel case should have been decided on the
sounder basis of wrongful death, as opposed to the "invasion of the personal rights
of the matrimonial status." The court was faced with the precedent denying re-
covery to the mother for damages resulting from abortions to which she had con-
sented, 32 but this should have presented little difficulty since the father, and not
the mother, was bringing the action.
CONCLUSION
Concepts of fairness and justice in the protection of human interests change
as society, in its development, makes new evaluations of those interests. The field of
tort liability for injury or death to the infant in the prenatal state is rapidly chang-
ing at this time. Many courts have yet to make their first decision allowing re-
covery for injury to the unborn child.
From an examination of the cases which have given careful consideration to an
action by the child injured while a fetus, or an action by the parent for the death
of the fetus, whether negligent or intentional, it would appear that the tendency
is to abandon the viability requirement and to place greater reliance on medical
ucience in the proof in establishing the cause of action.
i. I DAVID P. MACOUBRIE
32. Sayadoff v. Warda, 125 Cal. App.2d 626, 271 P.2d 140 (1954).
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